Absfract-We analyze the stability properties of an end-to-end congestion control scheme under fixed heterogeneous delays, and for general network topologies. The scheme analyzed is based on the congestion control game of [l], with the starting point being the unique Nash equilibrium of that game. We prove global stability of this solution (and hence of the congestion control algorithm) under a mild symmetricity condition. We further demonstrate the stability of the algorithm numerically for various delays, user numbers, and topologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
In communication networks, delays between users and resources of the network are most of the time not negligible. In the context of the Intemet, these delays vary from order of tens to hundreds of milliseconds, and affect the stability of end-to-end congestion control algorithms. The communication delays in the network are in general heterogeneous in the sense that forward delays between the users and the resources are different from the feedback delays. It is possible to consider end-to-end congestion control schemes in this setting as feedback systems with delay where users vary their flow rates in accordance with the delayed feedback they receive from the system resources. Depending on the specific network, this feedback signal may be in the form of packet losses as in Transfer Control Protocol (TCP), marked packets or variations in round trip time (RIT) the packets experience.
Several congestion control and pricing algorithms have been introduced in 121-[SI, whose stability properties have recently been investigated in the presence of non-negligible delays [6] - [8] . Johari and Tan [8] have analyzed the local stability of a delayed system where the end user implements the 'primal algorithm' ( [2] , [3] ) which is a TCP-like rate control algorithm. They have considered a single link accessed by a single user, as well as its multiple user extension under the assumption of symmetric delays. In both cases, they have provided sufficient conditions for local stability of the underlying system of equations. Massoulie [7] has extended these results to general .network topologies and heterogeneous delays. In another study, Vinnicombe [6] has also provided sufficient conditions for local stability of a user source law which is a generalization of the same algorithm.
Within the distributed congestion control framework of [2] , [3] , Kunniyur and Srikant [9] have examined the question of how to provide the congestion feedback from the network to ' Research supporred in pan by the NSF Grants CCR 00-85917 and ECS 02-25481. the user. They have proposed an explicit congestion notification (ECN) marking scheme combined with dynamic adaptive virtual queues, and have shown using a time-scale decomposition that the system is semi-globally stable in the no-delay case. Deb and Srikant [IO] , on the other hand, have focused on the case of single user and a single resource, and have investigated sufficient conditions for global stability of various congestion control schemes. Liu, Bapr, and Srikant [ l l ] have extended the framework of [2] , [3] by introducing a primal-dual algorithm, which has dynamic adaptations at both ends (users and links), and have given a condition for its local stability using the generalized Nyquist criterion. Wen and Arcak [12] have used the passivity framework to unify some of the stability results on primal and dual algorithms without delay, have introduced and analyzed a larger class of such algorithms for stability, and have shown robustness to variations due to delay. In another recent study, Alpcan and Bagar [I31 have proposed a similar scheme based on game theory, where queueing delays in the network are used as congestion feedback. They have also provided sufficient conditions for global stability at a bottleneck link under nonnegligible communication delays.
In this paper, we analyze in the presence of heterogeneous delays the global stability of the congestion control and pricing scheme introduced earlier in [l], which is based on noncooperative game theory. We provide sufficient conditions for the global stability under heterogeneous delays on a general topology network. Specifically, we make a mild symmetricity assumption on the variation of aggregate flows at links with respect to individual delays. We note that the condition obtained for the global stability shares a similar structure with the local stability results obtained in the earlier studies [5]- [8] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section I1 we introduce the network model as well as the game theory based congestion control framework, and state the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium (NE) solution. Global stability of this NE is established under a gradient algorithm in Section 111 for the ideal -no delay-case. Section IV contains the stability analysis and sufficient conditions for global stability of the same algorithm in the presence of heterogeneous delays. In Section V we illustrate the theoretical results obtained numerically. The paper concludes with the remarks of Section VI.
A CONGESTION CONTROL GAME
The network model and the congestion control game in this section have been introduced in our earlier study [I] . They are presented here in a concise form for completeness. We consider a general network model based on fluid approximations, similar to the one in Each user is associated with a unique connection, or path R between a source and a destination node. The zth user sends its nonnegative flow, x, 2 0, over its path R,. A routing matrix, A := [(al.,) ] of ones and zeros, is defined as in [2] , which describes the relation between the set of routes R = { 1. . . . . M} associated with the users (connections) and links 1 E C. We assume without any loss of generality that A has no rows or columns that are identically zero.
Using the routing matrix A, the capacity constraints of the links are given by Ax 5 c, where x is the (AT x 1) flow rate vector of users and c is the ( L x 1) link capacity vector. The flow rate vector, x, is said to be feasible if it is nonnegative and satisfies this constraint. Let x-i be the flow rate vector of all users except the zth one. For a given fixed, feasible x-i. there exists a strict finite upper-bound m,(x-i) on flow rate, xZ, of the zth user based on the capacity constraints of the links:
For the given general topology network model, we propose a network game with AT users. It is assumed that the routing problem has already been solved and individual routes, R E R, do not change during the connection. Our analysis is based on noncooperative game theory. Here, the users are noncooperative in the sense that they have no means of communicating with each other about their preferences, and each user tries to optimize his usage of the network independently. A specific cost function, J , is assigned to each user, which will be indexed by i for user i. This cost function not only models the user preferences but it also includes a feedback term capturing the current network state. The ith user minimizes his cost, Ji, by adjusting his flow rate 0 L: xi 5 mi(x-i) given the fixed, feasible flow rates of all other users on its path,
The cost function of the ith user, Ji, is the difference between a user-specific pricing function, Pi, and a utility function, Ui. The pricing function P, depends on the current state of the network, and can be interpreted as the price a user pays for using the network resources. The utility function of the ith user is defined to he increasing and concave in accordance with elastic traffic as well as with the economic principle, law of diminishing returns. We focus on the bandwidth as the main resource in the system. Therefore, the utility of the ith user depends only on its own flow rate. Thus, the cost function is defined as
We note that Pi does not necessarily depend on the flow rates of all other users; 'it can be structured to depend only on the flow rates of the users sharing the same links on the path of user i.
In the given context of the network game, the Nash equilibrium is defined as a set of flow rates, X* (and corresponding costs J*), with the property that no user can benefit by modifying its flow while the other players keep theirs fixed. Furthermore, if the Nash equilibrium, x*, meets the capacity constraints as well as the positivity constraint with strict inequality, then it is an inner solution. Mathematically speaking, x* is in Nash Equilibrium, when xr of any ith user is the solution to the following optimization problem given that all users on its path have equilibrium flow rates, xTi:
where x-i denotes the collection {xj : j. E Rj n R~}~=I,...,M.
To proceed further, we make the following two assumptions.
AI. Pi(x) is jointly continuous in all its arguments and twice continuously differentiable, non-decreasing and convex in xi, i.e.
aPl(x)/azi >_ 0 : a*Pi(X)/ax; 2 0.
(2)
A2. V ( Q ) is jointly continuous in all its arguments and twice continuously differentiable, non-decreasing and strictly concave in xi, i.e. Moreover, the optimal solution is an inner one, 0 < zj Al-jxjf < c~ , VI, under the additional assumption: A3. The ith user's cost function has the following properties
Theorem 11. I below establishes that the congestion control game admits a unique NE under the following further assumption:
A4. The price function Pi(x) of the ith user is defined as the sum of link price functions on its path, where F' l is defined as a function of the aggregate flow on link 1, and satisfies (2) with i replaced by 1.
Theorem 11.1. Under AI-A4, the network game admits a rinique inner Nasli equilibriuin.
The proof of this theorem can be found in [I] .
GLOBAL STABILITY IN THE DELAY-FREE CASE
We consider a simple dynamic model of the network game where each user changes his flow rate in proportion with the gradient of his cost function with respect to his flow rate. Note that this corresponds to the well-known steepest descent algorithm in nonlinear programming [14] . Hence, the user update algorithm is:
for all i = 1,. . . A f , where Ml(All) is the set (number) of users whose flows pass through the link, 1 E Ri; t is the time variable, which we drop in the second line for a more compact notation; and fi is defined as fi (-) := aPl ( . ) / a x i .
By assumption A4, the partial derivative of f i with respect to x i , a f i ( . ) / a x i , is non-negative. Next, we establish the result that the system defined by (3) is asymptotically stable on the set X , which is invariant by assumption A 3 under the gradient update algorithm (3). In order to see the invariance of X , we investigate each boundary of X separately. When x, = 0 for some i E M , we have x i > 0 from (3) under assumption A 3 due to the gradient descent algorithm of user i. Hence, the system trajectory moves toward inside of X . Likewise, in the case of 51 = cl for some 1 E C, it follows from (3) and assumption A3 that P i < 0 V i E M I , and hence, the trajectory remains inside the set X .
The equilibrium state of the system (3) in X is of course the unique NE, x*, referred to in Theorem LT. Since ATKA is non-negative definite and d2Ui/dxg is uniformly negative definite, V(x) is strictly decreasing, V(x) < 0, on the trajectory of (3). Thus, the system is asymptotically af (-) 
$(t -r ) := X j ( t -T l i -T U ) .

jEM1
In addition, let q be an upper-bound on the maximum roundtrip time (RTT) in the system: Thus, the following bound on Q,, and thus on x2, follows immediately:
Taking the derivative of &(t) with respect to t , we obtain
3.q (9)
Let S, := -min,, E X -d2uz(zz) > 0. Using (8) and (9) , it is possible to bound Gt(xS) and ?z(s) on s E [t -q , t ] with dx:
To simplify the notation, define l E R i
Hence, we have the following bound on O i ( x s ) , s E [t-q,t]:
Qi(xt) -q y i h 5 @i(xs) 5 @i(xt) + QYiJ;.
(1 1)
We next show that V(xt(q5)) is non-increasing, and obtain a contradiction to the initial hypothesis that the set is not empty. Assume that afi(Zi(t-~))/aZi = a f i ( Z : ( t -r ) ) / a Z : , V z j E M i : Vt for each link 1. This assumption holds for example when fi is linear in its argument. Let B be defined in such a way that BTB := ATKA, where the positive diagonal 2Withour any loss of generality, we define r/(xs) = 0, s E [-2q. -41. matrix K is defined in Section III. Also define the positive diagonal matrix
where Q ( x ) := d2Ui(zi)/dx:. Then, using ( l l ) , we obtain
where everything is evaluated at t. Now,'for any fixed trajectory generated by (5), and for a frozen time t , a sufficient condition for V(x,) 5 0 is where 11 . 11 is the Euclidean norm. 
We next find a lower bound on p. From ( Hence, S' is the largest invariant set in S, and for any trajectory of the system that belongs identically to S, we have x, = x*. In other words, the only solution that can stay identically in S is the unique equilibrium of the system. This then leads to the following theorem: 
V. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
The results presented in Section IV are evaluated numerically using MATLAB. The delay differential equations are solved using the delay differential solver, dde23 [ 181. The utility function for the Zth user is chosen as u a = ui log(si + l), where ui is a user-specific positive preference parameter. The pricing function at the link 1 is defined as where cr is the pricing constant. We choose here the cost function, cost parameters, and link capacities in accordance with assumptions AI-A4.
In the case of a single link shared by AI users, the user update algorithm follows directly from (9, and is given by We first investigate single-user on a single-link case for illustrative purposes. The parameters in user's cost function are chosen as U = 1 and ct = 1. We simulate the system under communication delays of r = 0.5, 1, and 2 as observed in Figure 1 . From Theorem IV.1, the condition for stability is calculated as r < 0.42. Since this condition is only sufficient the system could remain stable for r > 0.42, which is indeed what happens. However, the rate of convergence decreases significantly for increasing r, and for delays r > 2 the system becomes unstable. The effect of the number of users on system 'We note, however, that in a network implementation cost parameters a and U can be adjusted "online" through an adaptive algorithm, which takes capacity constraints on the network into account, in order to satisfy A3 and make the NE an inner solution. stability is demonstrated in the next simulation. The delay in the system is symmetric and chosen as ri = 0.5, Vi. Figure 2 shows that increasing the number of users has a similar effect as increasing the delay as captured in Theorem IV. 1.
In the next set of simulations, the number of users sharing a single link is A l = 10. The user utility parameters, u i and delay ri are randomly chosen with uniform distribution in the ranges u i E [lo: 201 and ri E [0.1, 0.51, respectively. Figure 3a shows flow rates of individual users for the initial condition being the origin for all users, and Figure 3b shows the same for a randomly picked initial condition. Although the delays are larger than the theoretical bound T, , , , < 0.05, the system can be seen to be stable. We next explore extensions to general topologies. Due to computational limitations of the dde23 solver, we choose a simple network topology with two links as shown in Figure 4 . The propagation delay between the two links is 0.2 and users' delays to their corresponding links are chosen randomly with a uniform distribution in the range [0.1, 0.31. Cost parameters are U = 5 and a = 0.5 and are symmetric for all three users. The results observed in Figure 4 are also in accordance with the results of Theorem IV. 1, VI. CONCLUSION In this paper we have analyzed the stability properties of the unique Nash equilibrium of this game for general network topologies and under a mild symmetricity assumption. The upper-bound on communication delays given in the sufficient condition is inversely proportional to the square root of the number of users multiplied by the cube of a gain constant. We note that this structure is similar to those of local stability results reported in other studies [6] - [8] .
Finally, we evaluate stability of the congestion control scheme numerically for various delays, user numbers, and simple topologies for a specific cost structure. The theoretical and numerical analyzes indicate a fundamental tradeoff between the responsiveness of the user update algorithm and the stability properties of the system under communication delays.
